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GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF UNION
RACIAL POLICIES
ROBERT J. HICKEY*
The purpose of this article is to analyze the various laws' which
regulate union racial practices and the interrelationship among them.
There are eight federal regulatory schemes which affect a union's racial
policies. They are: (1) the United States Constitution—the fifth
amendment; (2) the Railway Labor Act; 2 (3) Section 8(b) (1) (A),
(2), and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act; 3 (4) the Civil
Rights Act of 1964; 4 (5) Executive Orders No. 10925 and 11114; 5
(6) the Union Program for Fair Practice; 6 (7) the Secretary of La-
* A.B., Providence College, 1959; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1962; LL.M., George-
town University, 1964; Attorney, National Labor Relations Board. The views expressed
in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board or
any of its Members.
1 This subject has been considered from various viewpoints by many authors.
Among the more outstanding articles are: Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of
Unionism, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435 (1963); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2
Viii. L. Rev. 151 (1957); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Board and Racial
Discrimination, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 563 (1962) ; Sovern, Race Discrimination and the
National Labor Relations Act, 16 N.Y.U. Conference on Labor 3 (1963); Weiss, Federal
Remedies for Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions, 50 Geo. L.J. 457 (1962); Welling-
ton, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 Yale L.J. 345
(1961); Note, Administrative Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation, 112
U. Pa. L. Rev. 711 (1964). The prime concern of all these articles is the duty of
fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act.
2 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
3 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 1 151 (1964).
4 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
5 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963). Following preparation of
this article, Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), became effective, This
order supersedes Executive Orders 10925 & 11114, but has little effect on the sub-
stance of the earlier orders, since the material parts of all of them are the same. The
only change is that, hereafter, the administrative agency enforcing the orders will
operate out of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, Labor Department, rather
than the President's Committee. Consequently, it is proper to discuss Executive Orders
10925 and 11114 in the course of this article.
0 N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
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bor's Apprenticeship Regulations; 7
 and (8) Titles I, IV, and V of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 8
 In addition, there
are state laws and private contract clauses which govern union activity
in this field. Each of these systems of regulation will be discussed in
the following pages.
I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The fifth amendment provision that "no person shall ... be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" 9 oper-
ates as a limitation on the conduct of the federal government. Because
of this, it must be shown that union activities are undertaken pursuant
to government directive, or that the Government itself is involved in
order for the fifth amendment to apply to such activities. 10 It can be
argued that a union possesses governmental authority sufficient to im-
plicate the Government in its actions." Federal labor laws grant to
unions the power to act as exclusive bargaining agents for all of the
employees in a bargaining unit. It also grants the union power to have
hiring-hall and union-shop agreements. When a government permits a
private body to govern or control the lives of a portion of its citizens,
it must be concluded that the private body is an arm of the state,
subject to control under the fifth amendment; 12 the power to act as
exclusive bargaining representative and to control hiring through hir-
ing-hall and union-shop agreements, granted by federal legislation, con-
stitutes such permission. In Railway Employees v. Hanson,' the
Supreme Court declared that the enactment of a federal statute autho-
rizing union security agreements constituted governmental action upon
which the Constitution will operate, even though a private action is
required to invoke federal sanctions.
Governmental activity can readily be seen in a case where a union
takes some affirmative action pursuant to a federal statute. It should
also be remembered that a union's failure to act where it has a duty to
act will constitute governmental action for purposes of the fifth amend-
ment. By receiving the benefits of federal statutes, the union assumes
a duty to exercise the power received for the purpose for which it is
given—fair and effective representation of the employees in the unit.
Thus, if the union fails to represent these employees, it should be held
accountable under the Constitution.
7 50 Stat. 664 (1937), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 50 (1964). The Regulations promul-
gated under this section are collected in 29 C.F.R. §6 30.1-.16 (1965).
8
 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
9
 Compare Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 33 (1947),
with Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation, 67 Yale L.J. 1327 (1958).
io Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
11 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
12 Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
is 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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An alternative to the direct governmental approach set out above
is the governmental assistance theory. Under the latter theory, the
Government, by granting special powers to a union, undertakes to
supervise the exercise of those powers. If the Government fails to
exercise proper supervision, it becomes a participant in the union's
misconduct and is forced to exercise its responsibility under the Con-
stitution. 14 In Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm.," the district court
found that both the due process and the equal protection clauses of
the federal constitution had been violated by the failure of the Gov-
ernment, i.e., the Department of Labor, and a state agency to end
union discrimination in a government certified apprentice program on
a government project.
II. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The Railway Labor Act's does not contain any express provision
that a union must represent fairly all the employees in a unit, nor
were the union's racial practices discussed during the legislative hear-
ings and debates on the act." Despite this background, however, the
Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R." found that the act
imposed a duty of fair representation on the union. In so doing, the
Court made the following points: Section (2), Second, requires carriers
to bargain only with the representative chosen by their employees; the
Railway Labor Act takes away from the employees the right to bargain
individually on their own behalf; and, since the act deprives individuals
of the right to bargain on their own, the choice of a representative by a
majority of the employees can be assumed to impose a duty on the
representative chosen to represent all employees in the bargaining unit,
at the risk of losing the special status conferred on it by the statute.
Thus, a union can still determine who shall or shall not be members;
but if it becomes an exclusive bargaining agent, it must represent all
members of the union fairly, impartially, and in good faith. Further-
more, it must consider the requests and expressions of views by non-
members of the unit with respect to collective bargaining with the
employer. This does not mean that the representative may not consider
legitimate differences between groups in a unit; but that discrimination
based on irrelevant and invidious criteria, such as race or color, is
prohibited by the statute.
In a later case, Conley v. Gibson," the Court further elaborated
on the union's duty. It was held to extend to the day-to-day adjust-
14 Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra note 12.
16
 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. 111. 1963), vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964).
16
 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
11 67 Cong. Rec. 4499 passim (1926).
18 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
19 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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ments in the contract and other working rules, resolution of new prob-
lems, and the protection of employees already covered by the contract,
as well as to the making of the agreement. Otherwise, as the Court
noted, there would be little value in having a representative during the
contract term.
The question of which forum is to enforce rights under the statute
was raised and answered by the Supreme Court in the Steele case." It
was argued there that the forum should be the National Railway Ad-
justment Board. Section. (3), First(i), of the Railway Labor Act'
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the National Railway Adjustment
Board in cases involving interpretations and application of the collec-
tive bargaining contracts of disputes between employees and their
employer. There is no mention of disputes between the employees and
the union. The Court found that "in the absence of any available ad-
ministrative remedy, the right . . . to a remedy . . . is of judicial cog-
nizance.""
III. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The National Labor Relations Act" applies to all nontransporta-
tion labor relation activities." Like the Railway Labor Act, in the
National Labor Relations Act there is nowhere any mention of racial
discrimination. However, there are sections in the act from which the
duty not to discriminate may be inferred." Each of these sections will
be discussed separately below.
20 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 18.
21 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
22 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 18, at 207.
23 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
24
 Pan American World Airways v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 324 F.2d 217
(9th Cir. 1963).
25 The pertinent sections of the act are H 7 & 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. H 157-58 (1964):
§ 157. Right of employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organi-
zation as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3) of
this title.
§ 158. Unfair labor practices.
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Pro-
vided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the
Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be pro-
194
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A. Section 8(b)(2)
In Miranda Fuel Co., 2° the National Labor Relations Board held
that a union violated section 8(b) (2) 27 when, for arbitrary or irrele-
vant reasons, it caused an employer to alter the employment status of
an employee-member of the union. This ruling was applied in the first
hibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours
without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or
in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained,
or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor
practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on
or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or
the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section
159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered
by such agreement when made; and (ii) unless following an election held
as provided in section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the
effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at
least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have
voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an
agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimina-
tion against an employee for nonmembership in a tabor organization (A) if
he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not avail-
able to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable
to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure
of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uni-
formly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee be-
cause he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall
not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an
employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discrimi-
nate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his
failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it
is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section
159(a) of this title „ •
20 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
27
 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
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race discrimination case, Hughes Tool Co.,28 in which the Board held
that a labor organization, when acting as an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative, cannot exclude, segregate, or otherwise discriminate among
members of a bargaining unit on racial grounds.
Section 8(b) (2) covers three distinct types of discrimination. The
first arises where a union discriminates against an employee to whom
membership in the organization has been denied or terminated on some
ground other than his failure to pay periodic dues and initiation fees.
The second and third arise where a union causes or attempts to cause
an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of section
8(a) (3).29 That section declares it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in a union, and further provides that no employer shall justify
any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor
organization. There are two observations that can be made on the
structure of section 8 (b) (2): First, the union's violation of the statute
does not depend on a relationship to section 8(a) (3); and second, the
union can cause a violation of section 8(b)(2)" which might or might
not be a violation of section 8(a) (3).
The legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act is, at
best, confused as to the union's duty of fair representation. The original
act, passed in 1935, did not cover unfair labor practices by unions, and
there is little evidence that Congress meant to consider the problem.
However, as noted above, the Supreme Court, when faced with a simi-
lar lack of provision in the Railway Labor Act, found that such a duty
existed by reason of the statute itself, and that the duty was enforce-
able in the courts. But, there is no reason to believe that, had the ques-
tion been presented to it prior to 1947, the Court's decision in the
Steele case would have been applied to the National Labor Relations
Act!'
In 1947, however, Congress expanded the scope of the act to
reach union labor practices. Here again there is little evidence one
way or another to indicate what Congress thought about union racial
policies. During the course of the debates, Senator Taft, the co-author
of the amended act, commented that if a union prohibited Negroes
from becoming members, it could continue to do so, but it could not
then ask an employer to fire a Negro because he did not belong to
the union." Representative Hartley, the act's co-author with Taft, went
28 147 N.L.R.13. 1573 (1964).
29 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
3° 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
31 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 18; see Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S.
892 (1955)
32 93 Cong. Rec. 4317-18 (1947).
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so far as to say that the bill required the union to represent employees
without discrimination "in any way or for any reason."" On the other
side of the picture, it was argued that the discrimination had to refer
to union membership." The basic fact is that Congress did not really
consider the matter, and the few isolated comments available point in
both directions. Despite this, there is no indication that Congress did
not give to the word "discrimination" its ordinary meaning, which
would clearly encompass racial discrimination." The only limitation
on this is that the discrimination must be union related.
In Radio Officers Union v. NLRB,8° the Supreme Court held that
there must be both discriminatory treatment and a motive to encourage
or discourage union activities. This minimum requirement for a finding
of discrimination means that the discrimination need not be based on
union membership per se." As for the motive element, the Court in
Radio Officers held that specific evidence of the employer's improper
motive is not necessary to find a violation if discouragement or en-
couragement of union activity is the natural and foreseeable conse-
quence of the employer's activity. In NLRB v. Brown," the Court held
that the Board need not inquire into the employer's motivation where
the employer's conduct is demonstratively destructive of employee
rights or where no legitimate business interest will be served. Other-
wise, there must be a specific showing of motivation."
Where a union causes discrimination, it may be presumed that
encouragement of union activities will result. Any preferential treat-
ment must benefit one group at the expense of another. If the employer
is a party to the discrimination, it demonstrates the strength of the
union and will encourage support for it. However, economic discrimina-
tion such as the integration of seniority lists upon merger of companies
might be a legitimate goal which the law permits. In Humphrey v.
Moore," the Supreme Court held that a union could favor one group
of employees over another if it acts upon "wholly relevant considera-
tions" and "not upon capricious or arbitrary factors."'" While economic
discrimination on relevant factors may be justified, it is obvious that
race cannot be such a relevant factor. Race is so arbitrary and capri-
33 Id. at 3535.
34 1 Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, at
548 (1948).
35 "Discrimination" has been held to mean racial discrimination in other statutes.
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
33 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
37 Ibid. See dissenting opinion by Judge Friendly in NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co.,
supra note 26, 326 F.2d at 180.
38 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
39 Ibid. See also NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
40 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
41 Id. at 350
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cious a distinction that it should not be allowed to form the basis of
economic discrimination to the detriment of the individuals involved.
Where a union's request is based on racial' factors, the employer's ac-
quiescence to the union's demand• clearly demonstrates to other em-
ployees the union's power to affect job security. Thus, the discrimi-
nation has the foreseeable consequence of encouraging support for the
union.
Until now, we have been considering affirmative conduct on the
part of the union to influence the employer . to discriminate against his
employees. It should be remembered that the union can discriminate
against employees in the unit without involving the employer. This
may occur where the union has an affirmative duty to act, and it fails
to act. Examples of this are the failure of a union to attempt to end
discrimination at the plant on the part of the employer or other em-
ployees, or its failure to process a grievance for racial reasons. In this
situation, there is a duty imposed on the union, but not on the em-
ployer, to affirmatively end discrimination. The second part of section
8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to discriminate
against an employee who has been denied union membership. The
union's failure certainly violates the act with respect to a nonmember,
and should be held to violate the act with respect to members on the
theory that a man who belongs to a union which does not protect him
is a member in name only and not in fact, and is thereby entitled to
protection.
B. Section 8(b)(1)(A)
In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 42 the Supreme Court held that a union
was under a duty to represent all the employees for whom it was certi-
fied. On that same day, the Supreme Court in the Steele case" an-
nounced that a union could not discriminate against members of a unit
on the basis of race. In 1955, in Syres v. Oil Workers," the Supreme
Court held that the Steele doctrine applied to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, but it left open the question whether this duty was enforce-
able before the courts or the Board. In Steele the Court held that the
duty was enforceable in the courts only because the Railway Labor Act
had no provision covering employee-union relationships. The National
Labor Relations Act, on the other hand, does specifically cover this
relationship.
By terms of section 8 (b) (1) (A)," a union is forbidden to restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under section 7 of the
act. Section 7 gives the employees the right to bargain collectively
42 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
43 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 18.
44 Supra note 31.
45 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § I58(b)(1)(A) (1964).
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through representatives of their own choosing, or to refrain from such
activity. Section 9 of the act makes the collective bargaining repre-
sentative designated or selected by the majority of the employees the
exclusive representative of all employees. In receiving the right to act
as exclusive bargaining representative, the union also assumes the duty
to represent fairly all the employees in the unit; otherwise, there would
be little value to an employee in giving up his right to bargain
individually" for an empty right to be represented by a union that
does not care about his interests. By refusing to represent the
employees, the union restrains the employees from choosing an effec-
tive representative.
In 1947, when section 8(b) (1) (A) was passed, Congress was
concerned with a wide range of union conduct including the employee-
union relationship. On its face, section 8(b)(1) (A) gives the Board
a broad power to remedy union interference with the rights of indi-
vidual employees. However, it can be effectively argued that Congress,
by enacting this section, was attempting to impose on the union the
duties imposed on the employer under section 8(a) (1). 47 In Tanner
Motor Livery, Ltd.," the Board held that the employer violated
section 8(a) (1) by discharging employees picketing in protest of
racially discriminatory hiring practices by the employer. In Associated
Grocers," the Board held that an employer coerced Negro employees
by placing an advertisement in the newspaper asking for white em-
ployees. Thus, it is clear that certain racial policies of an employer
violate the act. This does not mean that the same conduct by a union
would violate the act, or that conduct by a union which violated
section 8(b) (1) (A) might also violate section 8(a) (1) if undertaken
by the employer. It is obvious that the coercion or restraint that can be
exercised by the employer or the union will differ in form according to
the role which each plays in the industrial scheme; for instance, a
union cannot promise an employee a wage increase. Thus, a union
could be guilty of violating section 8(b) (1) (A) by certain conduct
which would not be a violation for the employer. In the Hughes Tool
case," the Board found that a refusal to represent an employee because
of race violated section 8(b) (1) (A).
There is no reason why the Steele doctrine cannot fit into the
existing legislative scheme. In International Ladies' Garment Workers
4a J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
47 93 Cong. Rec. 4136 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball). The absence of the
word "interference" does not change the results. See International Ladies' Garment
Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961).
48 148 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1964)
49 134 ,N.L.R.B. 468 (1961).
50
 Supra note 28
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v. NLRB," the Supreme Court approved a broad coverage for section
8(b) (1) (A). No particular reason appears why the duty of fair
representation cannot be channeled through remedies provided by
section 8(b) ( 1) (A) rather than through the courts.
C. Section 8(b)(3)
Another section of the act that has been suggested as a vehicle"
for the enforcement of the duty of fair representation is section
8(b) (3)," which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union acting
as representative of the employees to refuse to bargain collectively
with the employer. Under Professor Cox's theory, the duty to bargain
collectively means the duty to bargain fairly on behalf of the em-
ployees." Representative Hartley stated that what is now section
8(b) (3) guarantees an employee "the right to require the union that
is his bargaining agent to represent him without discriminating against
him in any way or for any reason, even if he is not a member of a
union."'
Section 8(b) (3) was meant to impose on the union the same duty
as the employer has under section 8(a) (5). Both sections must be read
in conjunction with section 8(d) imposing good faith requirements on
the parties. There are two ways to read these sections in conjunction:
First, the duty of the union is the same as the employer's, the employer
has no duty to fairly represent the employees and hence, the union has
none either; or second, the union is not bargaining in its own right, but
as the representative of the employees, and it cannot be acting in good
faith if it is not representing all the employees in a unit. Furthermore,
under Professor Cox's theory, the processing of grievances is part of
the bargaining process and, thus, a refusal to process a grievance con-
stitutes a refusal to bargain 5e
It is settled that a union cannot insist on a racially discriminatory
clause being included in a contract. 57 Both the union and the employer
have a duty not to make an agreement involving discriminatory
employment practices which they know, or should know, to be
unlawful." What if discrimination exists and the union does nothing
about it? If a union does not press for fair treatment for the employees,
it is in fact agreeing to a discrimination clause, and section 8(b) (3)
51 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
52 Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Viii. L. Rev. 151 (1957).
53 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964).
54 Cox, supra note 52.
55 93 Cong. Rec. 3535. Little weight can be given to this comment, however, since
it is the only remark to this effect in the legislative history.
53 Cox, supra note 52.
57
 Conley v. Gibson, supra note 19.
58
 Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 1957).
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Could be read as imposing a duty on the union to attempt to secure an
antidiscrimination clause in the contract. 59
D. Enforcement of Board Orders
After a charge is filed, the Board's General Counsel will investi-
gate it to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to support the
allegations. If support is found, a complaint will issue. The General
Counsel will then attempt to work out a satisfactory settlement. If
this should fail, the Board will hold a hearing over which a trial
examiner will preside. The record, along with the trial examiner's find-
ings and recommendations, will be sent to the Board. If no exceptions
are filed, the trial examiner's decision will be final; otherwise, the
Board will issue its own order directing that the union cease and desist
in its conduct. Review of the Board's order is available in a United
States court of appeals." 0
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Both Titles VII and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196461 cover
discrimination in employment.
A. Title VII
Section 703 (c)" 2 makes it an unlawful employment practice for a
labor organization (1) to exclude or expel from its membership or
otherwise discriminate against any individual because of race; (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or
refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities,
or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment
because of race; and (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an individual in violation of section 703(a).° 3
Section 703(a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an
employer on account of race to (1) fail or refuse to hire or discharge
any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment; and (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.
59
 Central Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848
(1956).
60 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). Sec generally Silverberg,
How to Take a Case Before the National Labor Relations Board (1959).
61 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
62 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
63 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
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Section 703(d) 44 makes it unlawful for any employer, labor organiza-
tion, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship
or other training or retraining program to discriminate on account of
race in admission to, or employment in, any program established
to provide apprenticeship or other training.
A labor organization is covered if it (1) maintains a hiring hail
for a covered employer; and (2) has twenty-five or more members and
is (a) certified under the Railway Labor Act or the National Labor
Relations Act, (b) recognized by a covered employer, or (c) related
to a covered labor organization as a chartered, chartering, or joint
interest labor organization." An employer is covered if he is engaged
in an industry affecting commerce and has twenty-five or more
employees" in the current or preceding calendar year." An employee
means any individual employed by a covered employer."
The new act is broader than the National Labor Relations Act as
to employees covered since it covers supervisors and management
employees. About the only persons not covered are shareholders and
directors. On the other hand, the number of employers covered under
this act might be less than under the National Labor Relations Act.
Excluded are small employers (less than twenty-five employees), the
United States Government, a United States corporation wholly owned
by the Government, states and political subdivisions, a bona fide
private membership club (other than a union) which is exempt from
taxation under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, Indian
tribes and businesses located near Indian tribes which give preferential
treatment to Indians, employers of aliens outside of any state, religious
groups using employees for religious activities, and educational insti-
tutions as to the employment of individuals performing educational
activities."
While the statute appears to cover all types of discrimination, it
does include specific exceptions. Discrimination based on religion, sex,
or national origin is allowed, where there are bona fide seniority or
merit systems, on a basis of productivity or on a geographic differ-
ential." Nor is it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
give and act upon the results of a professionally developed ability
test."
64 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(d) (1964):
65 § 701(e), 78 Stat. 253 (19M), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (1964).
Be This figure is reached over a four year period.
67 § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
68 § 701(1), 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1964).
69 These exemptions are found in § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1964); § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964); § 703, 78 Stat. 255
(1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
79 § 703(h), 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S:C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
71 Ibid.
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The major drawback to Title VII is its complicated enforcement
procedures. The individual discriminated against must file with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 12
 within ninety days of
the unlawful practice." If the filing is in a state which regulates dis-
crimination in employment, then no charge may be filed by the person
aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have
been commenced under state or local law." If not settled, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission can then act" to vindicate the
employee's rights." Since the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's power is purely conciliatory, it must seek by persuasion to
obtain voluntary compliance within sixty days." The statute does not
specify what role, if any, the aggrieved party will play in the process.
If the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is unable to obtain
compliance, it shall notify the person aggrieved, in order that he may
bring a civil action within thirty days. The suit must be brought in the
district in which the discrimination allegedly occurred, or in which the
employment records are maintained, or in which the aggrieved would
have worked. If the respondent cannot be served with process in the
designated places, the action may be brought in the district in which
the principal office of the respondent is located. In certain circum-
stances, the courts may appoint an attorney for the aggrieved party,
may authorize the commencement of the action without payment of
fees and security, and may allow the Attorney General to intervene if
the case is of general importance. The court can grant relief only if it
finds the existence of an intent to discriminate." In the above proce-
dure, it is assumed that the person aggrieved filed the initial action.
However, any commissioner may file an action with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission," and it is possible that a private asso-
ciation may bring an action on behalf of the aggrieved."
In addition to the method of enforcement set out above, the
72 § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
73 § 706(d), 78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964). This period is
extended to 210 days where a state or local proceeding is required, or thirty days
after the person's receipt of notice that such proceedings have been terminated. Ibid.
74
 § 706(b), 78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964).
Ts A court may, upon request, stay the proceedings for an additional sixty days,
pending termination of the state proceedings. § 706(e), 78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e) (1964).
76
 The state proceedings are not res judicata to the federal action. See § 706(g),
78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
77 § 706(e), 78 Stat. 259	 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
78 § 706(g), 78 Stat. 259
	 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
73
 While the EEOC has the power to initiate a complaint before itself, it cannot
institute an action before a court. However, once the court has rendered its decision,
the EEOC can seek compliance on its own. § 706(i), 78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(i) (1964).
B 3
 The statute is ambiguous on this point.
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statute also provides, in section 707," that whenever the Attorney
General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of
persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of the rights secured by the act, he may bring a civil action
on his own initiative. Such a pattern exists only when the denial of
rights consists of something more than isolated, sporadic incidents.'
Such an action need not be first processed by a state agency and must
be given preferential treatment.
B. Title VI
Section 601" provides that no person shall be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving federal assistance on the
grounds of race, color, or national origin. The term "program" includes
any program, project, or activity for the provision of services including
education, training, health, welfare, rehabilitation, or other services,
whether provided by employees of the recipient of the federal assis-
tance or by others through contracts or other arrangements with
recipients. The term also includes work opportunities and cash, or loan,
or other assistance to individuals, or provision of facilities for fur-
nishing services, financial aid or other benefits to individuals." In the
employment field, the main programs that would be covered by Title
VI are employment service," unemployment compensation," and
training under the Manpower Development and Training Act and the
Economic Opportunity Act."
Financial assistance includes grants and loans of federal funds,
the detail of federal personnel, the grant or donation of federal
property, and the sale or lease of, or permission to use, federal property
with or without consideration. 88 However, government procurement
contracts appear outside the scope of Title VI..
The act is aimed primarily at state and local governments. The
term "recipient" is defined as including any state, political subdivision,
or instrumentality of a state; any public or private institution or
organization to which federal assistance is extended, directly or
through another recipient, but excluding the ultimate 'beneficiary."
Despite this broad coverage, state and local governments will bear most
81
82
83
84
88
86
87
88
89
78 Stat. 261 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1964).
110 Cong. Rec. 14270 (1964)	 (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
78 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
29 C.F.R. § 31.2(g) 	 (1965).
29 C.F.R. § 31.4 (1965).
29 C.F.R. § 31.6 (1965).
29 C.F.R. § 31.5 (1965).
29 C.F.R. § 31.2(e)
	 (1965).
29 C.F.R. § 31.2(h)	 (1965).
204
• ...1,TP	 • nn-1.
UNION RACIAL POLICIES
of the program's practical impact, since they are the most common
channel for these programs.
Enforcement of Title VI is left to the appropriate federal agency
or department.9° Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of Labor
issued the following enforcement procedure: a person who believes
himself aggrieved shall file a written complaint with the Secretary
within ninety days after the discrimination." If, upon investigation, the
Secretary finds a failure to comply or a threat not to comply with
Title VI, he shall seek voluntary compliance.92 Failing this, suspension
or termination of the assistance may be undertaken following a hearing
in which the respondent has an opportunity to be heard and following
notification to the appropriate committees of the House and Senate
having legislative jurisdiction over the program involved. The act
provides for judicial review of the Secretary's action."
V. PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Two Executive orders are pertinent to our discussion, Executive
Order 10925 94 and Executive Order 11114. 95 Executive Order 10925
prohibits discrimination in employment for work done under govern-
ment contracts. Executive Order 11114 extends this rule to cover con-
tracts for federally-assisted construction projects. The Executive
orders apply not only to those operations under the contract involved
but to all of the contractor's operations. 9° In addition, the contractor
must include this clause in all subcontracts.' Executive Order 11114
authorizes the individual agencies to designate other program partici-
pants to be included.
Contract means any binding legal agreement. Government con-
tracts include contracts for supplies or services or the use of property
by the contractor." Federal assistance contracts include not only
agreements with a construction contractor but also some agreement
under which the agency receiving federal assistance performs the work
itself." Construction is defined to include rehabilitation, alteration,
conversion, extension, demolition, or repairs of buildings and highways,
90 	602, 78 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964).
91 29 C.F.R. § 31.8(b) (1965).
92 29 C.F.R. § 31.8(a) (1965).
93 § 603, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1964).'
94 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
95 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963).
ofl 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) ; 28 Fed. Reg. 6485, 6486 (1963).
07 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963). However, this does not
apply below the second tier, or where the subcontractor is exempt under the statute or
where a material part of the supplies purchased are not being obtained for use in
a government contract or government assisted construction.
98 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2(h) (1965),
99 41 C.F.R.	 60-1.2(1) (1965).
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or other changes or improvements to real property. 1°° Excluded from
the scope of the statute are contracts for work to be performed outside
the United States in which there is no recruitment within the United
States, and contracts for less than a set dollar value. 701
Like Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, primary responsibility for
enforcement is placed in the contracting agency. 102 In addition, the
executive vice-chairman of the Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity has the power to assume jurisdiction over matters before
an agency where he considers it necessary or appropriate to the
achievement of the Executive order's objectives. There is no formal
procedure whereby the individual can seek redress on his own ; 103
instead, there is an executive process through which the aggrieved
employee may file. 1°4 The employee must file his complaint within
ninety days of the alleged discrimination with the appropriate govern-
ment agency, or with the Committee on Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity, which shall refer the complaints to the proper agency. The
agency shall investigate and resolve the matter subject to review by the
executive vice-chairman, who shall attempt to induce voluntary com-
pliance. If either the agency or the vice-chairman recommends termina-
tion or suspension of the contract, there shall be a hearing. Final
approval of termination or suspension must be had through a three-
member panel of the Committee.
The main theme of the Executive orders is the responsibility of
employers to end discrimination; they affect unions only incidentally.
For instance, under Executive Order 10925, section 301(3) 1" provides
that a contractor will send to each labor union with which he has a
collective bargaining contract a notice advising it of the contractor's
commitment under the orders; section 304 100
 directs the presidential
committee to use its best efforts to persuade a union to cooperate with
the purpose of the orders; and section 302(d) 1°7
 requires bidders on
government projects to provide the committee with statements in
writing from officers of labor unions with which they deal that they will
not discriminate and will cooperate with the implementation of policy
of the orders, and will agree that recruitment, employment, and the
terms and conditions of any proposed contract shall be in accordance
with the Executive orders. An illustration of remedies provided an
employee upon a finding of racial discrimination by a union is supplied
100 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2(v) (1965).
101 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4(a) (1965).
102
 26 Fed. Reg. 1977, 1978 (1961).
103
 Compare Taylor v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 271 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1959).
104
 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.20 to .43 (1965).
106
 19 Fed. Reg. 1977, 1978 (1961).
100 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
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by Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm.'" in which a district court
allowed a Negro to sue a union where a government construction
contract was involved.
VI. UNION PROGRAM FOR FAIR PRACTICE
On November 15, 1962, more than a hundred international and
national unions signed a no-discrimination pledge.'" Under the pledge,
the unions agreed to accept all eligible applicants for membership with-
out regard to race; to refuse to charter locals in which membership
would be segregated and to end segregation where it did exist; to have
locals seek no-discrimination clauses in their contracts with employers
both during employment and in apprentice programs; and to effectively
administer no-discrimination clauses. The enforcement provisions of the
pledge seem vague, but there appears to be no reason why these mutual
pledges could not be treated in the same way as any other promise
which induces reliance and is held binding for that reason. 11°
VII. APPRENTICESHIP REGULATIONS
The Apprenticeship Training Service was established in the
Department of Labor on August 6, 1937. 111 The statute creating the
Service authorizes and directs the Secretary of Labor to formulate and
promote the furtherance of labor standards to safeguard the welfare
of apprentices. Pursuant to this mandate, the Secretary, on December
13, 1963, issued regulations regarding equal opportunity in federally
registered training programs. 112 Under these regulations, unions and
employers must select apprentices on the basis of qualifications alone,
in accordance with objective standards which permit review; they must
remove the effects of previous discriminatory practices by developing
new lists; and they must ensure nondiscrimination in all phases of
apprenticeship and employment during apprenticeship. If an appren-
tice program conforms to these criteria, the Secretary will certify it,
which will result in contribution of financial assistance by the Bureau
of Apprentice Training. Another advantage to certification is that
employees in such a program may be paid below the minimum wage.'"
The enforcement procedure under the regulations is set forth in
sections 30.11 and .12. 1 " Any applicant or apprentice who believes
los 223 F. Supp. 12 (ND. Ill. 1963), vacated as moot, 332 F.Zd 243 (7th Cir
1964).
1 " N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
110 Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1932).
111 50 Stat. 664 (1937), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 50 (1964).
112 29 C.F.R. § 30.1-.16 (1965).
118 It should be noted that schools teaching apprentices in programs created under
this statute will receive contributions from the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, as well as assistance from the Department of Labor.
114 29 C.F.R. §§ 30.11, .12 (1965).
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that he has been discriminated against may file a complaint within 180
days of the offense with the Bureau of Apprentice Training or its field
representative. Complaints received in the Bureau headquarters will
be transmitted to the field for processing. After an investigation, and
upon receipt of a regional director's concurrence in the findings of the
field officer, or a decision of a hearing officer that the apprentice
program is not in conformity with the regulations, the Administrator
shall so inform the private parties designated by the industry in
question to achieve voluntary compliance. Following expiration of the
time for voluntary compliance or exceptions and replies, the Adminis-
trator will render a final decision. If the Administrator refuses to
decertify, it is possible that he could be forced to do so by court
order.'
VIII. LABOR-MANAGEMENT--  REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT
There are three titles in the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act"° which could possibly regulate a union's racial
policies. The first of these is Title I, which provides a "Bill of Rights"
for union members, including the right to nominate candidates, to vote,
to attend meetings, to participate in the deliberations of union
meetings, and to speak and assemble freely." 7 Section 101(a) (5)
provides for machinery to cover union discipline. The second relevant
title is Title IV"' which establishes machinery for the election of
officers.
The third, and most important title, is Title V 1" which declares
that union officers and representatives occupy positions of trust and,
therefore, acquire a duty to manage, spend, and invest union funds and
property in accordance with standards generally applicable to trustees,
taking into account the special problems and functions of labor
organizations."° The general principles of the bill incorporate the
existing trust law and apply it to union officials.' The duty of fair
representation is essentially a fiduciary obligation imposed on the
union to represent all of its members fairly. In Johnson v. Nelson, 122
the Eighth Circuit held that Title V imposed a fiduciary duty in its
broadest application. Under this reading, Title V should impose a duty
of fair representation on the union toward its members.
Methods of enforcing rights guaranteed under the act vary with
119 Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., supra note 108.
Ho 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401	 (1964),
117 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U,S.C. §§ 411-15 (1964).
118 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (1964).
110 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 501-04 (1964).
120 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
121 H.R. Rep. No. 70741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82 (1959).
122 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
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the title involved. Title I rights may be enforced both in a United
States district court123 and a state court.' 24 Title IV provides that if a
union member has exhausted his internal remedies, or if no final deci-
sion has been rendered on his complaint within three months, he may
file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary shall inves-
tigate the complaint and, if he finds reasonable cause, may bring an
action in a district court to set aside the election and hold a new one. 12'
Title V is enforced by a charge of a union member that an official has
violated his fiduciary duty to the union itself. If the union itself fails
to seek the appropriate relief, the union member may sue the accused
wrongdoer in a federal court. 126
IX. SECTION 301(a) OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT
Section 301(a) provides 127 that suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce, or between labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
over the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy and
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. In Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills,'" the Supreme Court held that section 301 created a
federal common law for labor, and in Smith v. Evening News,'" this
ruling was extended to cover suits by an individual employee when
aligned with the union. Finally, in Humphrey v. Moore,'" the Supreme
Court allowed an individual employee to sue a union because of its
failure to represent him fairly. The Court noted, however, that a union
is free to take a position between two disputing groups of employees
when it acts honestly, in good faith, and without hostility or arbitrary
discrimination. While the right of an employee to sue on the basis of the
contract"' is now settled, this does not mean that an individual can go
immediately to court whenever he feels his rights under the contract
have been abridged. In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 132 the Supreme
Court, in holding that a discharged employee must first use the griev-
123 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964).
124 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
125 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
120 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) 	 (1964).
127 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)	 (1964).
128 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
121) 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
130 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
181 The cases cited by the Court refer to employers subject to the NLRA, but
the same rules would apply under § 204 of the Railway Labor Act. See International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
132 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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ante procedure" established in the contract before initiating a section
301 suit, stated:
As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies,
federal labor policy requires that individual employees wish-
ing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the con-
tract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and
union as the mode of redress. If the union refuses to press or
only perfunctorily presses the individual's claim, differences
may arise as to the forms of redress then available . . . . But
unless the contract provides otherwise, there can be no doubt
that the employee must afford the union the opportunity to
act on his behalf . . . And it cannot be said, in the normal
situation, that contract grievance procedures are inadequate
to protect the interests of an aggrieved employee until the em-
ployee has attempted to implement the procedures and found
them so."4
If an individual is suing under the contract, he is bound by the
terms of the contract, including not only the written terms, but also
past practice of the parties, grievance and arbitration precedent, and
industry and area practice. Since the contract reflects the interest of
the union, the employer, and the group of workers, as well as that of the
individual, the employee must show either that the interpretation given
by the union and employer is unreasonable, or that such interpretation
is contrary to law.
There are two possible ways in which an employee might sue on
a contract: by express provision and by implied provision. Twenty-two
per cent of the labor contracts in the United States prohibit discrimina-
tion on account of race."' This clause, when connected to the substan-
tive terms of a contract, will give an employee a direct action under the
contract. The rights of the employee will arise on the terms of the con-
tract as it is written at the time of the abridgement. Once fixed, this
claim cannot be taken away by a subsequent agreement of the union
and employer,'" although such a right might cut off future claims.
The second method of enforcement arises by reason of Section
9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act which establishes the status
of the union as exclusive bargaining representative. The proviso to this
section expressly permits an individual employee to present his griev-
ances directly to the employer for an adjustment according to the terms
133 Ninety-four per cent of labor contracts now provide for arbitration of grievances
arising under the contract. BNA, Basic Patterns in Union Contracts § 51.7 (1961).
134
 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, supra note 132, at 652-53.
135 BNA, supra note 133, § 95.1.
136 Cf. International Ass'n of Machinists, 2 Ry. Lab. Bd. 87, 96 (1921).
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of the contract without intervention of the union."' How shall this
right be enforced? In Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.,' the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that an individual had an absolute right under the
proviso to process his grievance through the grievance and arbitration
procedures of the contract. However, if the employee wants to go to
the courts and the employer and the union do not object, then he may
do so.13° This latter event is not too likely to happen since both the
employer and the union will prefer the established procedure of the
contract to that of the courts.
There are two procedural problems to this approach: (1) How to
select an arbitrator; and (2) how to divide the costs. If a permanent
arbitrator is provided for in the contract, the employee should be bound
to accept him, but if the contract provides for an ad hoc arbitrator,
then the individual should have a role in the selection of the arbitrator.
As for the costs, this author suggests the following division: (1) If the
employee wins and the employer-union's argument was unreasonable,
the cost should be borne by the employer and union alone; (2) if the
employee wins but the employer-union's position was reasonable, the
employee should share in the cost along with the employer and union;
and (3) if the employee loses, he should bear the entire cost no matter
how reasonable his position was.
X. ARBITRATION
In addition to section 301, several of the other schemes discussed
provide, or could be interpreted so as to provide, for arbitration. Some
of these are the following: (1) A court trying a fifth amendment issue
could appoint an arbitrator as a special master; (2) a court under the
Railway Labor Act could require that parties use the machineryl"
under that act for grievances against an employer (this could be done
by requiring the union to be a party to this action or to be bound by
the results of the proceeding) ; (3) the National Labor Relations Board
has held that a union has a duty to process a grievance through arbitra-
tion; 14 ' (4) a court, under the Civil Rights Act or Labor Management
Act, could also make use of an arbitrator as a special master; and (5)
the Apprenticeship Regulations allow for private arbitration. Whether
137 Elgen, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), modified on rehearing,
327 U.S. 661 (1946); Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), enforced as modified,
147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945) ; 93 Cong. Rec. 3702-03 (1947) (remarks of Representatives
Owen & Hartley).
138 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
138 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, supra note 132; Black Clawson Co. v. Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
140 Railway Labor Act § 3, First, 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153
(1964).
141 Business League of Gadsen, 150 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (1964).
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and to what extent these forums can provide for private arbitration
before enforcement is an issue at present. If arbitration is allowed, then
the enforcing agency or court should act as a reviewing court, check-
ing to see if there has been (1) adequate notice, (2) a reasonable time
for a hearing, (3) an impartial arbitrator, (4) an opportunity for the
employer to be present, to give evidence, and to cross-examine, and (5)
an award not repugnant to any act. If any of these are absent, the
agency or court should hear the complaint de novo.
XI. STATE LAWS
In addition to the federal forums discussed above, there are
twenty-five states which regulate racial discrimination in one form or
another. Since the coverage and enforcement of each state law varies
among the states, they will not be discussed in this article except to
note their relationship to federal law.
XII. FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
A. Employment
The extent to which individuals will be deprived of employment
opportunities is directly related to the power of a union to control job
opportunities. The union can directly control employment by excluding
Negroes from apprentice programs and by refusing to refer them from
hiring halls. It indirectly affects their job opportunities by refusing
them admission to the union, thus preventing them from obtaining jobs
with employers who have signed a union security contract which re-
quires membership in the union.
In many occupations, the only way for a potential employee to
qualify for employment is by successfully completing an apprentice
program. In these industries the extent of integration will be directly
proportionate to the number of Negroes possessing the required skills,
and while these programs are normally under joint union-employer
control, the role of the labor union is decisive inasmuch as it usually
determines who is to be admitted into the program. Control over
eligibility plays a significant role in the union's control of access to
skilled jobs, and so the union, by making apprenticeship eligibility
turn on irrelevant factors, can keep Negroes from these jobs. By
requiring a combination of qualifications as a prerequisite for admis-
sion, the union can be assured that Negroes will not qualify. A prime
example of this is the use of qualifying tests. Even if such tests are
administered fairly, they are discriminatory insofar as they rely on
culture and environment rather than on ability to do the work, since
the Negro will normally lag behind the white applicant culturally and
environmentally because of past denial of educational and cultural
opportunities.
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In industries such as construction, the men who will be employed
are recruited exclusively through labor pools controlled by the unions.
Being the sole employment agency, the union can influence the job
opportunities of Negroes by not referring them to jobs or by referring
them only to jobs which the white worker considers undesirable. One
device for job assignment which appears legitimate on its face is to
refer men on the basis of length of service in the industry. By doing
this, Negroes, who seldom have had sufficient employment in the
industry because of past discrimination, are passed over in favor of
white workers.
The ability of a union to discriminate in employment through
denial of membership in the union has its greatest impact where the
employer's contract includes a union security clause or where he
depends primarily upon the union for his supply of workers. Even if
an individual can gain employment on his own, a denial of union
membership will bar him from participating in decisions which affect
his life as an employee since it is fairly certain that a union, unwilling
to admit a Negro, will not represent him fairly as a nonunion em-
ployee.
Negroes can be barred from union membership by explicit racial
provision in the constitution and by-laws. In view of the fact that there
are only 172 segregated locals in the AFL-CIO, 142 however, this does
not pose too serious a problem. More important are the informal
methods of exclusion, such as requiring a candidate for membership to
be approved unanimously by the members or demanding an examina-
tion which the applicant cannot pass. Another method of control is
that of allowing Negroes membership, but placing them in segregated,
second-class locals, subordinated to an affiliated white local. Even if
the Negro is admitted to an integrated local, he can be controlled
through a threat of expulsion if he does not "stay in his place."
B. On-the-Job Discrimination
Even when they find employment, Negroes are not likely to secure
the same terms and conditions of employment as the white worker if
the union is adverse or is not interested in them. A Negro worker, who
finds that he is not a member of the union or is a minority member, is
powerless to protect himself if the bargaining representative will not
protect him, and, in the absence of adequate representation, the Negro
will be ignored for advanced training programs and promotions. The
union can directly affect a worker's employment opportunities through
pressure on employers, and indirectly control them through the senior-
ity system. The union can seek separate seniority systems, each re-
142
 2 AFL-CIO, Proceedings of the Fifth Constitutional Convention 216 (1963).
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stricted to certain jobs—the poorer jobs being assigned to the Negro
seniority list. Where there is an integrated seniority list, the union can
favor the white employee's claim over the Negro's.
XIII. REMEDIES FOR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
A. General Remedies
1. Conciliation. The Civil Rights Act, 143 the National Labor Re-
lations Act,'" the Executive orders,' and the Department of Labor's
Apprenticeship Regulations146 all provide for voluntary settlement.
This is perhaps the easiest remedy to obtain, but is also the least effec-
tive. A union is very likely to agree to a settlement of a particular case
of discrimination where there is no penalty if, in view of that limited
settlement, it can continue to discriminate against others. To correct
this, the settlement should contain a provision covering all discrimina-
tion and should provide for some form of immediate judicial enforce-
ment.
2. Disclosure. The National Labor Relations Act, the Executive
orders, and the Department of Labor's Apprenticeship Regulations all
allow or provide for disclosure. On the other hand, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act specifically forbids disclosure of the proceedings held
before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The argument
against disclosure is that it unduly harms a union's reputation and
makes any attempt to obtain voluntary compliance difficult. While this
argument has some merit, in certain cases the benefits of disclosure
would far outweigh these disadvantages. Where the employer is recal-
citrant or has a past history of continued violations, the publicity
created by disclosure might create public pressure on the union to end
its discriminatory practices. Even where the complaint is the first
against a union and it willingly complies with the employee's request,
disclosure would encourage other unions to end their discriminatory
practices without waiting for a charge to be filed, and it would also put
Negroes on notice of changes in union policies and the existence of laws
to protect them. Since disclosure does have a powerful impact, however,
premature disclosure should be avoided. The agency or office respon-
sible for disclosure should be sure that there is a violation and that the
information to be disclosed will serve its desired and lawful purpose.
3. Injunctions. Injunctions and cease and desist orders, enforcible
in the courts, are the most effective remedial weapons. The cessation of
existing discrimination is necessary in all cases. A union which refuses
143 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
144 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
145 Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) ; Exec. Order No. 11114,
28 Fed. Reg. 5485 (1963).
146 29 C.F.R. §§ 30.1-.16 (1965).
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to obey an injunction can be held in contempt of court and made to
pay a fine for each day of continued resistance. Another advantage of
the injunction is that it can be granted without a jury trial, thus in-
creasing the probability of relief in areas where the population supports
the discrimination. A temporary injunction could also be granted
where there will be a delay before the final decision.
4. Decertification. This is a remedy that can be provided by the
National Labor Relations Board.'" In Pioneer Bus Co.,'" the Board
held that where a union executes a racially discriminatory contract,
revocation of the contract is warranted, basing its decision on the fifth
amendment. Under Board rules, certification blocks the holding of
another election for a year.'" This allows the union a sufficient period
in which to obtain a contract and administer it. By this action, the
Board assists the union, but if the union refuses to represent all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit, no reason exists for the Board's con-
tinued assistance. The Board, an agency of the United States, cannot
allow this benefit to exist without becoming a participant in the dis-
crimination and thus violating the Constitution.' The remedy of
decertification is valuable only in the relatively few cases where there
is a certified union in its initial year of bargaining. In most cases,
unions, while the recognized representatives of the employees, are not
certified. Where the union is certified, it most frequently has estab-
lished a bargaining relationship of more than one year's duration.
5. Amendment of Certification. If the National Labor Relations
Board feels that a union will meet its obligation in the future, it can
amend the certification of the union to make explicit the fact that it
must represent all employees without regard to race. Like decertifica-
tion, however, it is of limited value, but when tied to other remedies
mentioned in this section, it might serve a useful purpose.
6. Contract Bar. Under Board rules, once a union has entered
into a contract with an employer, the contract prevents the employer
from recognizing another union for a reasonable period of time, not
to exceed three years. Where discrimination is shown, the Board should
lift the contract bar. The legal rationale for this is the same as in
the decertification situation."' This would present a threat to the
union on the rare occasion of another union attempting to raid the
unit.
147 It is possible that such a remedy could be provided by the National Mediation
Board under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151
(1964).
148 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
149 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1964).
158 International Ass'rt of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777 n.3 (1961) ; Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
151 Pioneer Bus Co., supra note 148.
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7. Disbarment. As noted above, most unions are recognized bar-
gaining agents. Because of this, decertification has little effect. In
order to reach these unions, the Board could issue a disbarment order
requiring that the union cease and desist from acting as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees until it can be shown that
it has rid itself of its discriminatory practices.' 52
 This would probably
be the most effective order available to the Board.
8. Refusal to Use the Board Election Processes. Decertification or
disbarment is of value only if the decertified or disbarred union cannot
gain access to the Board's election process. Under this approach, the
union could not seek a new election nor could it seek a place on the
ballot if another union seeks an election. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers' may rule
out this theory. The Court there held that the Board did not have
implied powers to withhold its processes from a union as a remedy for
the filing of a false non-Communist affidavit.'" The Court's decision
rested on two grounds: First, that Congress had provided an exclusive
remedy for the problem of Communists in another statute; and second,
that the Board could not punish a union for the acts of its guilty offi-
cers. Neither of these reasons exist in the case of racial discrimination.
Congress, as will be shown later, has not given an exclusive jurisdiction
over racial discrimination to any forum, and has allowed the Board to
participate in the enforcement of Negroes' rights. Further, the white
union members are as guilty as their officers, since they receive a direct
benefit from the discrimination. Having received the fruits of the dis-
crimination, they should not be heard to deny their liability afterwards.
9. Refusal to Process an Unfair Labor Practice by an Employer.
In Housing, Inc.,'" a Board trial examiner considered the question of
whether an employer could raise as a defense racial discrimination by
the union against members of the bargaining unit to a charge of refusal
to bargain with the union. The trial examiner, while finding that the
record before her failed to show discrimination by the union, stated:
A different question might be presented if Respondent had
in its employ in the bargaining unit a Negro whom the union
had refused to admit to membership. Respondent might then
appropriately raise the question whether a union which denies
membership to employees on the basis of race is fairly and
152 The Board could base the remedies in this type of case on those it issues
where a minority union is acting as exclusive bargaining agent.
153 352 U.S. 145 (1956).
151
 The rule of this case was followed by the Board in Alto Plastics, 136 N.L.R.B.
850 (1962), where a union violated its duties under the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act.
155 No. 26-CA-1578, NLRB, Feb. 24, 1964.
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equally representing all within the unit and accordingly
whether such union is lawfully entitled to recognition as the
employees' statutory bargaining representative."'
If the union deprives the members of their rights, it is no longer the
"representative" of them for the purpose of section 8(a) (5),157 and
the employer should not be compelled to bargain with it as the em-
ployee representative.
10. Disestablishment. This remedy should be ordered where there
is no other effective way to remedy the problem."' The prime example
of this is segregated locals. The only other remedy is a merger, which
would only create more problems. Ordering a union disestablished will
allow for the international or national union to start fresh with new
ground rules.
11. Damages. Both the courts and the agency can award compen-
satory damages against either the employer, the union, or both. It is
interesting to note that under the Railway Labor Act, a court can
award a fixed sum where there is no basis for determining the amount
of the loss suffered.'" What will be included or excluded in compensa-
tory damages is determined by the normal rules of damages.
12. Contract and Assistance Revocation. The Executive orders, 1"
Apprenticeship Regulations,"' and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act .'"
all provide for termination or suspension of government contracts or
assistance in the event of the contractor's noncompliance with non-
discrimination programs. The employer so involved will also be made
ineligible for future contracts or assistance. Contract cancellation can
be effected only against the contractor, but unions will be involved if
they operate hiring halls or administer seniority programs. The union,
of course, is a beneficiary of government assistance under the appren-
ticeship programs it maintains.
13. Requirement of a Contract Clause. In Business League of
Gadsen,'" the NLRB ordered that a union propose to the employer
contract terms specifically prohibiting racial discrimination. The Secre-
tary of Labor also requires that a formal no-discrimination provision
be included in contracts or standards involving apprenticeship train-
166 Ibid. See concurring opinion by Pope, J., in NLRB v. Pacific Maritime Assn,
218 F.2d 913, 917 n.3 (9th Cir. 1955).
1157
 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
158
 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
160 Clark v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 988 (WI , . Va. 1953).
160 Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); Exec. Order No. 11114, 28
Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963).
161 29 C.F.R. §§ 30.1-.16 (1965).
162 78 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
1 " Supra note 141.
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ing.784 Similarly, under the Union Program for Fair Practices,' unions
have agreed to seek no-discrimination clauses in contracts.
14. Section 501(c) (5) of Internal Revenue Code—Loss of Tax
Exemption. Section 501(c) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts
those organizations which have no net earnings inuring to anyone's
benefit, and have as their object both the betterment of the conditions
of those engaged in labor and the development of a higher degree of
efficiency in their respective occupations. This covers both unions and
apprentice programs.10° If a union refuses to represent fairly all of
the employees, it can hardly claim to be seeking their betterment or
attempting to increase their efficiency. Under such circumstances, the
union has failed to comply with the statute, and it should lose its tax
exemption.
15. Scope of Remedies. The orders of a deciding forum should be
broad enough to cover all discriminatory practices of a union and not
just the ones alleged in the complaint.
16. Compliance. In order to prevent the union from reverting to
its past practices, there must be some form of periodic check to see
that there is adherence to the orders of the agency, department, or
court. These checks will indicate what steps have been taken toward
compliance and determine their effectiveness until such time as the
agency, department, or court is fully satisfied that the union observes
and will continue to observe a nondiscriminatory policy.
B. Specific Remedies
All forums provide some remedy for the various forms of dis-
crimination discussed in the beginning of this article. This section of
the article will discuss these specific remedies.
1. Employment. Hiring is the responsibility of the employer, and
he cannot be relieved of this responsibility by allowing control to pass
into the hands of a union. Both the National Labor Relations Act and
the Railway Labor Act provide for union security provisions. Under
their provisions, membership must be available to all members on the
same terms and conditions. Where a Negro is denied membership in a
union, the union cannot in turn demand that the Negro be discharged
because he does not belong to the union." 7 Thus a union cannot cause,
or attempt to cause, an employer to discriminate in hiring without
violating the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) and the National Labor
Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act.
Under Executive Order No. 10925, a contractor must affirmatively
104 29 C.F.R. g 30.7 (1965).
100 N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
100 Rev. Rul. 59-6, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 121, 122.
107 93 Cong. Rec. 4317-18 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
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attempt to eliminate discrimination.'" This means that the employer
must have a defined recruitment program. This includes informing all
hiring personnel or sources of manpower, such as a union, that Negroes
are to be hired if qualified. In addition to direct hiring, the employer
should place advertisements in Negro newspapers as well as newspapers
of general circulation. He should send employment application blanks
to Negro colleges and employment agencies with Negro clients."'
While the employer must have this type of recruiting program, he
need not hire every Negro who applies. The employer is always en-
titled to consider the applicant's qualifications and competency and
does not have to hire a less qualified worker in preference to a more
qualified worker simply because the less qualified worker is a Negro.
This does not mean that where both a Negro and a white person are
qualified, the employer should not hire the Negro. The Civil Rights
Act (Title VII) allows the use of legitimate testing devices to deter-
mine who is qualified. The validity of a test which does not take into
consideration the cultural and environmental backgrounds of the appli-
cants has not yet been resolved. However, unnecessary tests or require-
ments should be illegal.
In correcting past discrimination, should an employer establish a
quota to fill jobs? Section 703 (j) of the Civil Rights Act holds that
quota hiring is not required. When this is read with other provisions
of the act, it appears that quota hiring is unlawful."' In any event,
quota hiring is barred by the National Labor Relations Board"' and
the courts."' This approach is clearly correct: First, because it is im-
possible in a heterogeneous society to set quotas; second, because it
prevents one group that has filled its quota from seeking more jobs
while allowing another group's quota to be filled with unqualified
workers; and third, because discrimination against a white person is
just as arbitrary and capricious as it is against a Negro. The only
correction for the past is best found in the future. If all discriminatory
barriers are removed, time will set an integrated industrial pattern.
Where an employer relies on a union hiring hall system as a
source of labor, the union must operate its hiring hall without regard to
168 Both the NLRB and the courts, under the Civil Rights Act, may issue affirma-
tive orders. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 259 (1964),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
169 See Myart & Motorola, Charge No. 63C-127, III. FEPC, 1964.
170 See § 703(j), 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964). The quota
system is also barred by the apprenticeship regulations issued by the Secretary of
Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 30.15 (1965).
171 Galveston Maritime Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (1964). The Board found
that quota hiring is based on irrelevant, invidious and unfair considerations.
172 Hughes V. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460 (1950). The Supreme Court upheld a
state court injunction on picketing in favor of a quota system.
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race. Section 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Ace" and
Section 703(c) (2) of the Civil Rights Act' make a refusal to refer an
individual for work because of his race an unlawful activity. There are
usually two reasons given by a union for refusing to refer Negroes—
that there are not enough Negroes available and that white employees
have seniority over them. Whether there is a sufficient amount of
Negro labor available can be easily ascertained. If there is not, it is
usually because the Negroes have not been admitted into apprentice
or training programs. As for seniority, the Supreme Court has upheld
a hiring hall arrangement where work opportunity is allocated on the
basis of seniority in the industry.'"
There are many remedies available where a union discriminates
in the operation of a hiring hall. The most obvious of these is to require
that the employer not use the hiring hall as his exclusive source of
labor.'" The union can be required to notify all possible applicants
that it will operate on a nondiscriminatory basis. If necessary, a union
can be ordered to establish a new nondiscriminatory hiring hal1 177
system with permanent records of referrals and denials and the reason
for each one. Finally, Negroes could be put on a priority list ahead of
out-of-town members. As for the hiring hall itself, jobs can be ordered
held on an integrated basis. If the hiring hall practices no discrimina-
tion in admission to the hall, it is unlikely to do so in referrals.
If Negroes do not possess the skills to do the work, they cannot
expect to qualify for the jobs. There is an increasing awareness that
the position of Negroes at the bottom of the economic ladder stems
from their unfavorable position in the labor market due to their short-
age of skills. Some of the solutions for this problem, such as the need
to provide for a basic academic education, lie outside existing labor
laws. On the other hand, if Negroes are to acquire these work skills,
it must normally be through apprentice or training programs which are
regulated under federal law.
Section 703(d) of the Civil Rights Ace" makes it an unlawful
employment practice for a union which alone or with an employer
controls an apprentice or training program to discriminate. The
Apprenticeship Regulations established by the Secretary of Labor
provide for extensive regulation of apprentice programs. Finally, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act provides for termination of assistance to
173 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
174 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (2) (1964).
175 Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
178 J.J. Haggert, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 633 (1962), enforced as modified, 321 F.2d
130 (2d Cir. 1963).
177 Ibid.
178
 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1964).
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training programs established under the Manpower Development and
Training Act!" and the Economic Opportunity Act.'
The possible remedies under these programs are quite varied. The
most important, from a negative view, is the termination or suspension
of benefits. From an affirmative view, the union can be required to
establish objective entrance requirements, to allow all applicants to
take fair tests which will be administered and graded fairly, to provide
assistance for those taking the tests, to treat all trainees or apprentices
without discrimination during their training periods, to refer all appli-
cants on a nondiscriminatory basis, and to submit a program for com-
pliance, as well as periodic compliance reports.
2. During the Course of Employment. The Constitution, the Rail-
way Labor Act,' the National Labor Relations Act,'" the Civil Rights
Act,'" Executive orders, 184 and the Apprenticeship Regulations 181 all
require that there be no discrimination during employment. "Employ-
ment" includes, but is not limited to, training, job assignment, rates of
pay, promotion, demotion, layoff, termination, and conditions of work,
such as segregated facilities. The three major problem areas are pro-
motions, segregated facilities, and discharges.
- The problem of promotions reaches a peak of difficulty in cases
where promotional decisions are made on a subjective basis. In such
situations, the only proof of discrimination is a head count and invoca-
tion of the law of probabilities. The danger of this approach is the
same danger accompanying quota hiring, discussed above.
Even where there are objective standards, the problems of dis-
crimination in promotion are not solved. The first difficulty is to
determine at which point in time the qualifications will be set. Three
possibilities present themselves: First, Negroes must be prepared to
meet the current standards imposed on white workers; second, Negroes
should be allowed to meet those standards which were in existence at
the earliest time they would have qualified for promotion but for discri-
mination based on race; or, third, they should be allowed to meet any
standards which came into existence between the time of their potential
eligibility for promotion until the present. The last test allows older
Negro workers to be promoted faster than newer employees of both
179 29 C.F.R. § 31.5 (1965).
189 Ibid.
181 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1964); sec Dillard v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry., 199 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952).
182 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964); see Business League
of Gadsen, supra note 141.
183 § 703(c), 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
184 Exec. Order No. 10925, § 301(1), 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); Exec. Order No.
11114, 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963).
183 29 C.F.R. § 30.6 (1965).
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races. This is not unfair to the white employees who must meet the
current standards since the Negroes involved would already have been
promoted and removed from the present competition if they had been
permitted to meet the standards prevailing when they were first
eligible.
Another complicating factor in promotions is the applicable stan-
dards themselves. The governing criterion should be that the selected
standards be relevant. The battle in this area has centered around use
of seniority as a standard. A complete disregard of seniority for older
Negroes would help to eliminate the effects of past discrimination, but
the Supreme Courtrai has held seniority to be a legitimate standard.
Conceding this, all forms and systems of seniority do not automatically
become permissible. For example, separate seniority lines would be
unlawful if based on a racial alignment which relegates Negroes to
certain types of jobs from which they cannot be promoted."' Only
systems which do not have the tendency to continue discrimination
should be allowed. Where a seniority clause is used to prevent advance-
ment, the remedy is to force the parties to work out a new system,
subject to the approval of the enforcing authority.'" Probably . the
most adequate remedy is to require the dovetailing of seniority systems
on the basis of individual hiring dates.'" However, at least one court
has upheld a remedy which allows Negroes to transfer to a white list
where the result is a loss of seniority for the transferred Negroes. 19°
The second major racial roadblock during employment is segre-
gated facilities. Section 708 of the Civil Rights Act"' requires that all
employees enjoy the same facilities, notwithstanding any state or loCal
law to the contrary. In Business League of Gadsen,192
 the National
Labor Relations Board held that a union had a duty to seek eradication
of segregated facilities and to process the complaint of a Negro member
protesting such segregated facilities.
The last major problem is that of discharge. Under the Railway
186
 Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, supra note 175.
187
 Jones v. Central of Ga. Ry., 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956).
188 There is a need for administrative or judicial guidance in this matter since the
majority can push for a clause to advance their interests at the expense of the minority.
See Maremont Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1964), where a Negro majority sought to
gain seniority by a change in the seniority system. In this case the union was ordered
to inform the employer that it had no objection to restoring to the white employees
the seniority to which they were entitled.
189
 O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961).
199
 Whitfield v. United Steelworkers, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir,), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 902 (1959). While the Court held here that the union and employer need not
consider the effect of past discrimination, the seniority system in the case allowed for
preference to be given to Negroes who passed qualifying tests.
191
 78 Stat. 262 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964).
162
 150 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (1964).
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Labor Act,'" the National Labor Relations Act,' and the Civil Rights
Act,195 a union cannot seek the removal of Negroes in order to secure
the position of white workers. Normally, back pay to cover an actual
loss caused by discriminatory discharge will be ordered. If the union
has caused, participated in, or refused to protest the discharge, it
should bear the burden of back pay.'° 5 The only other remedy that
could be provided would be reinstatement. However, reinstatement
cannot be ordered against the union alone. In order for this remedy to
be available, the employer must have participated in the unlawful
conduct.
A related problem arises in connection with the difficulties Negroes
have in being admitted to union membership. This is a problem only
insofar as it impinges upon employment opportunities during employ-
ment. All employees in a unit are affected by how their representative,
the union, represents them during contract negotiations and adminis-
tration. Representation is a democratic concept which requires that
those represented have a voice in the selection of a representative and
the policies he is to advocate. Employees who are excluded from this
process cannot expect that the union will allow them to participate in
the formulation of policy. It also can be presumed that nonmember
employees will not receive fair treatment from the union. The only way
to assure effective participation is to admit Negroes to membership, but
this is easier said than done.
The law primarily concerned with the internal affairs of unions
is the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Section 3 (o)
of this ace" defines "member" to include any person who has fulfilled
the requirements for membership and who has not withdrawn volun-
tarily or been expelled or suspended. It follows from this that where a
Negro meets all the stated membership qualifications, he should be
entitled to admission. In Hughes v. Local 11, Ironworkers," 8 the Third
Circuit held that a plaintiff who had satisfied all intra-union require-
ments except the ministerial acts precedent to formal admission was
entitled to membership. Thus, a Negro who meets all the requirements,
but who is denied membership, will be considered a member. But what
requirements must be met? In Moynahan v. Pari-Mutual Employees
Guild,199 the union required a two-thirds favorable vote by the member-
ship before admission, which the plaintiff did not meet. The Ninth
193 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1964) ; see Dillard v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., supra note 181.
194 § 8(b) (2), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
195 § 703 (c), 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
19° Richardson v. Texas & N.O. Ry., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957).
197 73 Stat. .519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 403(o) (1964).
199 287 F.2d 810 (3rd Cir. 1961).
tog 317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1963).
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Circuit held this to be more than a ministerial requirement and
required the plaintiff to meet it. Thus, by establishing requirements
similar to those in the Moynahan case, the union can be assured of
excluding Negroes from membership and still not violate the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.
Another possibility would be for a Negro to proceed under the
National Labor Relations Act. In Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard,
Inc.,200 prior to the amendment to the act prohibiting union unfair labor
practices, the Board, by way of dicta, noted that it had "grave doubts"
whether a union which discriminated in membership could be said to
fairly represent members of the excluded unit in its role of exclusive
bargaining representative.
In Galveston Maritime Ass'n, 201 the NLRB declared that when a
statutorily-authorized bargaining agent permits racial segregation or
discrimination in union membership, it constitutes inherently unequal
and unfair representation. The Board's position is that a union cannot
accord fair representation to employees arbitrarily excluded from
membership. The remedy for this breach would be to require the union
to admit all qualified persons to membership. 202
 In order to avoid the
problems of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
discussed above, the order should say that the union can use only non-
discriminatory qualifications relevant to union purposes, subject to
review by the Board or the courts.
Under the Railway Labor Act, the courts have taken a different
approach to the problem. In the Steele decision,2°2 the Supreme Court
held that the act does not deny to the union the right to determine
eligibility for membership. Having said this, however, the Court then
added that "the union is required to consider the requests of non-union
members of the craft and expression of their views with respect to
collective bargaining with the employer and to give them notice of and
opportunity for hearing upon its proposed actions."204 Thus, the Court
contemplates effective participation for Negro unit members in the
bargaining process and in the administration of the contract. Can this
really be accomplished without admitting Negroes to membership? It
should be noted that the Steele decision preceded by ten years the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.245 In view
of that decision, is it still possible to say that "separate but equal"
representation in union affairs is consistent with a theory of effective
2°0 53 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943).
201 Supra note 171.
202 See the remedy provided in Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
203 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
204 Id. at 204.
205 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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participation in union affairs? The Supreme Court has not passed on
this problem, and the lower courts are split. Todd v. Joint Apprentice-
ship Comm.'" and Betts v. Easley207 hold that the union has a duty
to admit Negroes to membership, but in Oliphant v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen,"8
 the Sixth Circuit held that there was no statu-
tory or constitutional requirement that Negroes be admitted. Until
the Supreme Court decides the question, it is impossible to give a
definite answer under the Railway Labor Act or the Constitution. 2"
In addition to the remedies set out above, a Negro may seek
redress through the Civil Rights Act. Section 703(c)(1) 210 makes it
an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization to exclude
or to expel from its membership or otherwise to discriminate against
an individual on grounds of race. Since this is the clearest expression
of the right to admission, it is likely that many Negroes will attempt
to use it as a vehicle for this purpose. But, for those unions subject to
the National Labor Relations Act, the NLRB will probably provide
the most effective remedy.
The right to membership is of little value if it does not allow
meaningful participation in the union's affairs, or if it can be taken
away at will. The first step toward effective participation in a union
is a nondiscriminatory atmosphere. Segregation in the bargaining
unit is bad and segregation in the union itself is equally undesirable.
This is the rule of the Civil Rights Act, 2" the National Labor Relations
Act, 212 the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 218 and
the Railway Labor Act. 214 If segregated locals or segregated member-
ships exist, the union should be ordered to end the segregation in a way
which prevents Negro members from losing any position or rights
because of integrated arrangements.
The principal statute to protect the right of a union member to
participate in union policies and procedures is the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act. Section 101(a) (1) guarantees to union
206 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1963), vacated as moot, '332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir.
1964).
207
 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
208 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959). Certiorari was
denied "in view of the abstract context in which the questions sought to be raised are
presented by this record." Ibid.
209 Under the Union Program for Fair Practices, supra note 165, most unions
have voluntarily agreed to end discrimination.
210 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U,S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1) (1964).
211 Ibid.
212 See Galveston Maritime Ass'n, supra note 171.
213 See Acevedo v. Bookbinders, 196 F. Supp. 308, 312 (S.DN.Y. 1961). Compare
Cleveland Orchestra Comm. v. Cleveland Fed'n of Musicians, 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir.
1962).
214 See Betts v. Easley, supra note 207.
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members the right to attend union meetings, to participate in their
deliberations, and to vote upon the business of such meetings. This
same section also guarantees the right of members to nominate candi-
dates and to vote in elections. Title IV provides for an extensive
regulation of union elections."'
Section 609 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act"' makes it unlawful for any labor organization or its officers to
fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under that act. Section
101(a) (5) 217
 provides that no member of a labor organization may be
fined, suspended, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of
dues, unless he has been served with a written copy of specific charges,
given reasonable time to prepare his defense, and afforded a full and
fair hearing. These sections, when read together, would appear to grant
sufficient protection against discipline being undertaken because a
Negro is seeking to enforce his right to participate in union affairs. In
addition, section 703(c) (1 ) 218
 would also protect him from discrimina-
tory discipline. Under both the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act and the Civil Rights Act, the court has the power to
grant immediate injunctive relief to prevent the union from effectuating
a disciplinary judgment. In the case of those in lower economic classes,
whether this relief will issue will often determine whether a Negro will
file and prosecute a complaint.
XIV. THE ACCOMMODATION OF RELATED FORUMS
While the existing laws and regulations outlawing discriminatory
union racial practices are basically similar, there are many variations
among them, both substantive and procedural. Because of this, we
must seek a means to coordinate them so that they can be effectively
administered and enforced in support of the Government's policy
against discrimination. In attempting this coordination, this author will
consider the merits of each forum and the primary jurisdiction of one
forum over another.
A. The Merits of Each Forum
1. Courts. Courts, because of delay, expense, lack of information
available to the plaintiff, and lack of expertise, will not prove as
valuable as administrative forms of enforcement. The delay occasioned
215 Title IV allows only the Secretary of Labor to challenge the election in a
court. § 402, 73 Stat, 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964). Title 1 would allow an
individual to go into court. § 102, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 402 (1964). For
the interrelationship of the two titles, see Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
216 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1964).
217 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5)
	
(1964).
218 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1)	 (1964).
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by court proceedings will limit the effectiveness of any rights which
they secure. In the case of employment, an order requiring a union to
cease interfering with the employment rights of the employees will
have little practical value to the Negro who is out of work or has gotten
another job. Under such circumstances, the Negro complainant will
drop the suit rather than continue it in hopes of a moral victory.
Unions, knowing of this, will be sure to press these complaints before
the courts in the hope that delay will work to their advantage.
The second fault of judicial enforcement is the expense. Most
Negroes .operating on low cost budgets will be extremely reluctant to
press for the protection of their rights in the courts because of the
expense involved. The prospect that attorney fees and court costs in
extended litigation will exceed any remedy granted will act as an effec-
tive deterrent to prosecution. If a case is important enough, civil rights
groups might be willing to underwrite the expense, but this is the rare
situation. Another difficulty facing prospective complainants is the
lack of access to pertinent information. In the administrative process,
the agency involved will do its own investigating. In the courts, the
individual is expected to gather the pertinent information at his own
time and expense.
Another disadvantage is that courts are institutionally ill-suited
to handle industrial problems. A judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon labor relations problems
as an administrative forum established for this very purpose. Also, by
spreading the cases among the courts, a uniformity of law cannot be
achieved, which is so necessary to prevent industrial conflicts.
2. The Fifth Amendment. Any relief sought on a constitutional
basis bears all the burdens of constitutional litigation. The courts will
try to avoid constitutional issues if that course is at all possible. It is
because of this that relief in the area of racial discrimination in
employment is yet to be granted.
3. Railway Labor Act. The Railway Labor Act provides no clear-
cut remedies against a union and has no impartial administrative
tribunal for trying these cases. The second major disadvantage is that
it applies only to employees, and not to applicants for employment.
4. Civil Rights Act. While the coverage of the Civil Rights Act
(Title VII) is the most extensive of any piece of existing legislation,
its enforcement procedures are so cumbersome as to render the act
ineffective in most cases of individual discrimination. Most people seek
employment where they believe that they have a chance of success,
and so they seldom will attempt to find work at those places where it
can be obtained only by great expense and delay. While this problem
can be eliminated through the assistance of the Justice Department or
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civil rights organizations, such assistance can be given in only a few
cases. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act will constitute an effective
remedy only where the acts involved cannot be reached by another
statute. The major fault of Title VI lies in its coverage, for its provi-
sions do not reach federal assistance given to an ultimate recipient who
is not an employee. Thus, employers who receive loans, grants, or con-
tracts for purposes other than employment are beyond the reach of
the statute.
5. Executive Orders. The Executive orders have only limited
applicability to agencies which are not in the executive branch. Another
disadvantage is that they are primarily directed at contractors and
subcontractors, not unions. Even if a complaint could cover union
practices, it is uncertain at this time whether the aggrieved party as
well as the government agency has the right of enforcement and, if so,
where this right can be enforced.
6. Apprentice Regulations and Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act. Both of these regulate only a segment of employment
relations. The Department of Labor has the experience to handle the
problems of vocational training, and it would appear that its remedies
are sufficient. As for the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, its coverage is not clear and enforcement procedures are
inadequate.
7 . Union Program for Fair Practice. Little can be said about this
concept because little has been done with or about it. This, of course,
amounts to a guilty verdict as to its effectiveness.
8. Section 301 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act. The rights guaranteed by section 301 are private con-
tractural rights. Because of this, any future benefit based on a present
contract appears illusory, since the right could be effectively destroyed
by a change in the contract terms. However, in Humphrey v. Moore,219
the Supreme Court extended the duty of fair representation to contract
cases. Thus, a change in a contract which results in the divestiture of
a right arising under a contract may be made only for non-
discriminatory reasons. The problems that remain under section 301
are that the section limits only jurisdiction over contractural rights,
and that the enforcement procedures it prescribes are centered in the
courts.
9. National Labor Relations Act. The prosecution of discrimina-
tion as an unfair labor practice, allowing an NLRB administrative
action, guided by the General Counsel, to redress the wrong is desirable.
If the Board's jurisdiction is established, the relative simplicity and
lack of expense it incurs in comparison with judicial procedures
219 .323 U.S. 248 (1944).
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removes the chief obstacles to effective enforcement. In addition to a
public counsel to prosecute complaints, the Board has investigatory
and trial facilities necessary for successful prosecution and the exper-
tise required in the handling of discrimination cases. While racial
discrimination is new to the Board, other types of union discrimination
are not new. Since the Board has control over the entire employment
discrimination field, except for part of the transportation industry,"°
there would seem to be little sense in depriving it of jurisdiction over
racial discrimination. Two principal arguments are raised against a
declaration of the Board's jurisdiction. The first is that the Board,
already burdened, would be inundated if jurisdiction were vested in it.
This is the argument made whenever there is a change in the law to
protect the rights of the people. The argument was, is, and will be
without merit. If discrimination exists and is so widespread that any
forum would be inundated, all the more reason exists for allowing an
agency accustomed to large numbers of complaints to handle that type
of case. The second objection concerns the General Counsel's role,
whose duty under the act is to screen out unmeritorious cases. While
this is a necessary procedure, the difficulty is that there is no review
of his dismissal of an action. This, of course, is a problem that can be
solved only by Congress. If there are other forums available, the
aggrieved person should be allowed to proceed to them, but the new
forum should weigh the merits of the Board's dismissal in determining
whether it will dismiss the action as well.
10. State Regulation. There have been state laws covering dis-
crimination in employment for over twenty years. There is little reason
to discuss the merits of each state's plan except to say that, on the
whole, they have been extremely ineffective.
. B. Internal Rules of Accommodation
1. Civil Rights Act. It has been argued that the passage of the
Civil Rights Act indicates that Congress intended the act to be the sole
Source of protection against racial discrimination in employment.
However, the act itself does not show that Congress has provided an
unequivocal remedy for racial discrimination but, to the contrary,
suggests that jurisdiction in this area will be shared. During the hear-
ings on the legislation, Senator Clark, one of the floor managers of
Title VII, incorporated into the Congressional Record a letter from
the Justice Department interpreting the proposed title as not affecting
any right or authority of the United States or any agency to pro-
tect the rights of individuals against racial discrimination under
220 Pan American World Airways v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 324 F.2d 217
(9th Cir. 1963).
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existing laws 221 And just prior to passage, Congress rejected a pro-
posed amendment to Title VII giving this title the exclusive jurisdiction
over discriminatory racial employment practices.'
There is no indication that Congress intended to oust the NLRB
from participating in this jurisdiction. The passage of the Civil Rights
Act illustrates that Congress was dissatisfied with the refusal of the
NLRB to process racial complaints. As late as March 1963 President
Kennedy urged the Board to take appropriate action in racial dis-
crimination matters so that the enactment of the new legislation would
be unnecessary."' In view of the facts that Miranda' had been
decided, that Hughes Tool225 was pending, that the President had urged
that the Board participate in this area, and that legislative history
reflects that the Civil Rights Act was not to subtract from the National
Labor Relations Act, it is impossible to reach any other conclusion
than that the NLRB has jurisdiction in this field. In Business League
of Gadsen,' it was held that Title VII in no way limited the rights of
the Board. The Department of Labor had advised individuals who
claim racial discrimination to go to the NLRB when possible rather
than seek relief under Title VII. 227
2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the Executive Orders.
Section 603 (a) provides that nothing in the Civil Rights Act shall
reduce or limit the responsibilities of any labor organization under any
other federal law or the laws of any state nor shall take away any
rights or bar any remedy to which members of a labor organization are
entitled under such laws. Pursuant to this section, the Secretary of
Labor drafted regulations which provide, inter alia, that Title VI does
not affect the antidiscrimination program of the Executive orders."'
However, since Title VI applies to all agencies of the government and
not just to the executive agencies, it is possible for a contractor to be
covered by Title VI but not by the Executive orders. To avoid a con-
trast in standards, the Secretary's regulations further provide that the
requirements applicable to construction employment shall be those set
forth in the Executive orders. 229
 Thus, the accommodation policies of
the orders should apply to Title VI. The regulations under the Execu-
221 110 Cong. Rec. 7209 (1964).
222
 110 Cong. Rec. 13650-52 (1964). The amendment was offered by Senator Tower.
228 52 L.R.R.M. 246 (1963).
224 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963).
225 Supra note 202. The Board issued its decision in this case one day prior to
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
226 Supra note 192
227 58 L.R.R.M. 235 (1965).
228 29 C.F.R. § 31.13(a) (1965).
229 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(c) (1965).
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tive orders declare that the rights and remedies which they provide are
not exclusive and do not affect the rights and remedies provided else-
where by law, regulation, or contract."' In Business League of Gad-
sen,2" the Board issued an order carrying but an agreement reached
under the Executive orders. In Housing, Inc.,' an NLRB trial exam-
iner indicated that if a union interfered with an employer's obligation
under the orders, the employer could refuse to bargain without
violating the National Labor Relations Act.
3. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Under
section 103,2" union members retain whatever state or federal remedy
they had prior to the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act. Section 603 2'4 provides that nothing contained in
Title I affects the rights of any person under the National Labor
Relations Act. In 1963 the Supreme Court held that a union's refusal
to refer a member to a job 235 and a union's request that a member be
discharged for violating union rules"' were arguably subject to the
National Labor Relations Act. Relying on these decisions, the Eighth
Circuit, in Barunica v. United Hatters,237 held that discrimination by a
union against a member in the area of employment is in the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRB. It indicated that if the case occurred in an
area where the Board did not have jurisdiction or had declined juris-
diction, the complaint might be processed through the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act. Title V might encounter the same
difficulties, although there are no cases to date on this point. The
remedy under Title IV is declared to be exclusive for challenging
elections already conducted.
4. The Fifth Amendment, Section 301, and the National Labor
Relations Act. In Syres v. Oil Workers 238 and Steele v. Louisville &
N.R.R.,239 the Supreme Court showed that if a statutory ground was
available for deciding a case, it would be employed in preference to
the fifth amendment. Because of the several laws and regulations now
governing the field of racial discrimination, it would be an extremely
rare case in which a court would need to decide a case on constitutional
grounds. Whether the statutory duty would be enforceable by the
courts or the NLRB, alone or together, has not yet been decided.
230 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.1 (1965)
231 Supra note 192.
232 No. 26-CA-1578, NLRB, Feb. 24, 1964.
233 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
234 73 Stat. 540 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 523 (1964).
235 Local 100, Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
236 Local 207, Ironworkers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
237 321 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1963).
238 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
289 Supra note 203.
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Where a case arises under the Railway Labor Act, it must be decided
by the courts.
In Smith v. Evening News,' the Court held that an individual
had a right to sue on the contract even though the subject matter might
constitute an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations
Act. However, the Court noted that if "there are situations in which
serious problems will arise from both the courts and the Board having
jurisdiction over acts which amount to an unfair labor practice, we
shall face those cases when they arise." 241 Later, in Republic Steel v.
Maddox," the Court ordered an employee to exhaust his contractual
grievance procedure before being allowed to proceed with a section 301
court action. Thus, it is likely that in case of potential conflict between
a section 301 suit and an action before the Board, the court will order
the aggrieved to exhaust his administrative remedies. But this problem
is more theoretical than real, since an individual who has a choice be-
tween a court and an administrative forum will always choose the ad-
ministrative forum because of the great difference in expense and delay
involved.
5. Railway Labor Act and Apprenticeship Regulations. Neither of
these mention or discuss the problem of accommodation. However,
there is no reason to believe that the remedies provided are exclusive.
6. Federal-State Relations. The normal rule in the labor field is
that a state is pre-empted from acting where an action is arguably sub-
ject to a federal law. The Supreme Court, in Garner v. Teamsters
Union," enunciated the reason for this doctrine:
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of
law to be enforced by a tribunal competent to apply law gen-
erally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpreta-
tion and application of its rules to a specific and specially
constituted tribunal . . . . Congress evidently considered that
centralized administration of specifically designed procedures
was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to re-
sult from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward
labor controversies. . . . A multiplicity of tribunals and a
diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incom-
patible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of
substantive law."'
240 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
241 Id. at 197-98.
242 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
243
 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
244 Id. at 490-91.
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In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 245 the Supreme
Court laid down the following rule as to when a state must defer to a
federal court or agency: "[If] an activity is arguably subject to [the
NLRA] . . . the States as well as the Federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.'""
Using this standard in civil rights cases would obviously result in pre-
empting the states from the field, which would be an unwise result.
Since civil rights is a political and social, as well as a legal, problem, if
local and state governments can end racial discrimination on their
own, they should be given the opportunity to do so. Federal regula-
tion, even at its best, cannot insure acceptance of a no-discrimination
policy. If accomplished on a local basis, there is more likelihood of
popular acceptance and a speedy and effective end to discrimination.
Pre-emption, largely a matter of intent on the part of Congress to
occupy a field, raises the issue in this article whether Congress in any
of the laws and regulations discussed has evidenced an intent to pre-
empt the states from cases involving discrimination in employment. To
determine whether such intent exists, we must examine each law and
regulation.
In Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air
Lines,247
 the Supreme Court held that neither the Railway Labor Act,
the Civil Aeronautics Act, nor the Federal Executive orders so per-
suasively regulate the field of employment discrimination as to bar any
state regulation. The Court announced as its rule: "To hold that a State
statute identical in purpose with a Federal statute is invalid under the
supremacy clause, we must be able to conclude that the purpose of
the Federal statute would be to some extent frustrated by the State
statute." The Court did not think that the Colorado statute imposed a
constitutionally prohibited burden upon interstate commerce, but it
indicated that if states imposed onerous, harassing, and conflicting
conditions on interstate employers which hamper an employer's per-
formance of his function, or if the federal authorities intended to pre-
empt the states, such pre-emption would follow. To date, the only
intent that has been evinced by Congress has been in favor of sharing
the jurisdiction in this field with the states. Title VII' and VI 249 of
245 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
246 Id. at 245.
241 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
248 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). Section 705(g) permits the
EEOC to cooperate with and utilize state agencies. Section 709(b) permits the EEOC
to enter into agreements with state and local agencies under which the state or local
authority may be excused from compliance with the federal provisions. The EEOC
can determine what terms will be included in such agreements and how long they will
last. These agreements do not apply to suits by the Attorney General under § 707.
Even absent an agreement, § 706(b) requires that where an unlawful employment
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the Civil Rights Act, the Apprenticeship Regulations, 25° and the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 25 ' all specifically provide
for concurrent jurisdiction. For instance, under section 10(a) of the
last named act, the NLRB is empowered to cede jurisdiction over any
case to a state agency. 252
XV. CONCLUSIONS
"Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to
God the things that are God's."253 There is a remarkable parallel be-
tween this Biblical quotation and the interagency relationship in the
joint control of racial discrimination in employment. To understand
this parallel, one must understand the reasoning process of man him-
self. In his attempt to understand, man divides, subdivides, and further
divides the mass of material that comes to him daily. From these divi-
sions, he proceeds to formulate principles which are rules based on
abstractions. When he has• sufficient number of principles, he regroups
them into classifications called categories. These categories serve as
premises which he will accept in order to utilize most effectively his
time and energy in knowing the world about him.
Difficulties arise when the problem falls into none of his previously
existing categories or into two or more categories. The subject matter
of the quote and of this article is concerned with the latter aspect of
the problem. Thus, the question presented is what happens when a con-
flict of categories occurs. There are three possible approaches to this
problem: One, to disregard the problem; the second is to create a new
category; and the third is to retain the old categories and to work out
guides to prevent conflicts. The first approach has little merit, as can
be seen from the Church-State question. Here the religionist and the
secularist have disregarded the problem of overlap. The result has been
that thousands of persons have been left dead over a span of history
and, yet, there has been no solution. The second and third approaches
practice charge is filed which would also violate a state law, no action can be taken
by the EEOC until the state has been given an opportunity to resolve the problem.
249 78 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. I 2000d (1964). Title VI authorizes and directs
each department, agency or establishment of the United States to assist and cooperate
with the state, if a recipient of federal assistance is helping the state achieve voluntary
compliance with the statute. See 29 C.F.R. § 31.7(a) (1965).
250 See 29 C.F.R. § 30.16 (1965). The regional director has the duty to encourage
a state to adopt and implement the equal opportunity standards. Where a state has
adopted effective procedures to implement these standards, the regional director can
work out a division of responsibility with the state.
251 Section 103, 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1964), expressly preserves
the rights and remedies against a labor organization under state laws.
252 This does not include cases arising in mining, manufacturing, communications
or transportation. The Board has never exercised this power. See Pan American World
Airways v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, supra note 220.
255 Mark 12:17.
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both have merit, and the choice of approach is not always easy. How-
ever, this author believes that the third approach—that of accepting
existing categories and trying to formulate a policy of accommodation
among interested jurisdictions, which will allocate responsibility on the
basis of their interests and policies—is the best approach to problems
of racial discrimination by unions in employment.
"Enforcement" of the duty of antidiscrimination in the practices
and policies of unions is synonomous with a meaningful and effective
enforcement of that duty: absent such enforcement, members of minor-
ity groups are left without protection. From what has already been
said, the conclusion is obvious that a wide range of discriminatory prac-
tices could be eliminated if all the laws and regulations discussed were
strictly enforced. Although these laws and regulations often cover iden-
tical grounds, there is no reason for vesting exclusive authority in any
one forum while each aids in the effective enforcement of the federal
policy against discrimination. Such widespread discrimination exists
that there is no compelling need to place enforcement in a single agency
or forum. Each law or regulation can be viewed as furthering a national
labor policy of which racial discrimination in employment occupies but
one segment.
The argument against this theory is that unified control would be
more effective. There are two answers to this: First, there is no indica-
tion that Congress intended the area of labor law to be administered
by a single tribunal. An example of this is that Congress refused to
allow the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act to be ad-
ministered by . the National Labor Relations Board. The approach of
Congress has been the same in the field of civil rights. Even with the
Civil Rights Act itself there is a multiplicity of forums. Thus, to use
the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, Congress chose to abandon any
search for uniformity in racial discrimination by unions and decided
to suffer a medley of attitudes and philosophies on the subject. 254
Second, Congress might have wished to leave the problem to diverse
forums to see how each handled the problem before selecting one proce-
dure over another. In an area that is just beginning to develop and will
likely grow at a rapid rate, there seems much wisdom in this. To allow
one agency to have complete control would limit the potential effective-
ness of the law. Under the present program with diverse laws, proce-
dures, and remedies, it is likely that Congress will be able to evaluate
the program it wishes to adopt in this field.
In resolving conflicts as to application of the proper law, the rights
and liabilities that arise from discrimination in employment should be
determined by the law or regulation most closely related to the form
254 Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
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of discrimination. This ordinarily would be the forum which would
have jurisdiction over the subject were there no racial aspects to the
case. On the assumption that discrimination in employment in most
cases is a problem for the National Labor Relations Board, jurisdiction
would normally lie there.
While Congress has not chosen one agency to administer our labor
laws, it has indicated, with court approval, that primary jurisdiction
should be with the National Labor Relations Board. The Board is
better equipped than most agencies to handle this problem. Discrimina-
tion, coercion, interference, or breach of contract are the ordinary
matters handled by the Board. Here the Board's expertise in these
matters would make it more able than the other forums to handle these
problems. Of course, there are areas where the Board has no jurisdic-
tion and other forums must act. For example, railway employees, agri-
cultural workers and supervisors are all excluded from the Board's
coverage. Also, there are areas, such as the apprenticeship programs,
where the Board might bow to the expertise of another forum.
The above discussion is meant to show that a presumption in favor
of the Board's jurisdiction will normally arise, but that it may be over-
come by showing that another forum has greater claim to jurisdiction.
To do this, it would be necessary for the policies and interests of each
possible forum to be compared with those of the forum in which the
complaint was filed. Thus, the initial forum should examine the con-
tents of each law or regulation alleged to be applicable, seek to discern
the policies beneath them as they apply to the particular case of racial
discrimination before it, and choose the forum which will best effectu-
ate the national policy against discrimination reflected in the policies
of the pertinent laws and regulations. Despite this, the foregoing
methods of analysis might not indicate to the examining forum which
forum is appropriate, because the interests of the various laws and
regulations cannot always be determined with precision. In such cir-
cumstances the forum receiving the complaint should process the case
under its own procedures. In order to avoid unnecessary soul-searching
on the part of the receiving forum, all of the courts and agencies in-
volved should cooperate in drawing up practicable rules based on tested
guidelines, such as prior experience or effectiveness of remedy 2S 5
 This
could be done on an ad hoc basis by having the receiving forum notify
the other agencies when a problem is presented and then work out a
joint solution. Finally, where a person has sought a remedy under one
statute or regulation for the same alleged act of discrimination, he
should be barred from filing a complaint under some other law or forum
255
 An example of how the guidelines might work can be seen in the working
arrangement between the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.
See Kintner, An Antitrust Primer 145-46 (1964).
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unless it can be shown that he can only be protected by permitting this.
In the event that the analysis of the jurisdiction of the various
forums, upon which this proposed solution rests, is erroneous, this al-
ternative is suggested: Title VII should be amended to provide an ad-
ministrative agency, similar to the National Labor Relations Board,
which could grant all the remedies discussed herein. In addition, the
amendment should provide that after the complaint is filed and investi-
gated, a hearing will be held before a trial examiner from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The record should be sent to
the appropriate state with recommendations; if the state fails to act
within ninety days, the record should be transferred to the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission for a decision on the record. En-
forcement and appeal from this decision should be made in the same
manner as the National Labor Relations Act.
As a final note, it should be understood by all that all the laws,
or possible laws, prohibiting discrimination in employment obviously
cannot provide a complete answer to the problem of discrimination.
What is needed are programs to combat poverty, provide better educa-
tion, and eliminate discrimination in other areas of social contact. The
total of all programs combined with a change in human nature might
achieve civil rights for all.
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